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IN THE SUPRElffi COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DONALD H. MEYERS, and ENGINEERING ENTERPRISES, INC.,
d/b/a INTERMOUNTAIN AERIAL
SURVEYS,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

No. 17070

-vs.INTERWEST CORPORATION, a
Utah corporation; SKYCHOPPERS
OF UTAH, a Utah corporation;
and SKYCHOPPERS OF COLORADO,
a Colorado corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
SKYCHOPPERS OF COLORADO

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiffs to recover damages for
personal injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff Donald H.
Meyers and for loss of his services and other expenses allegedly
incurred by the corporate plaintiff Engineering Enterprises, Inc.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The plaintiffs brought this action against three
defendants, i.e., Interwest Corporation, Skychoppers of Utah and
Skychoppers of Colorado.
plaintiffs' complaint.

The first two defendants answered
The latter defendant, Skychoppers of

Colorado, appeared specially and moved to quash the process served
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upon it in the State of Colorado.

The plaintiffs moved the cot

for an order permitting them to amend the process in question,
which had already been served upon Skychoppers of Colorado.

Tr

trial court denied this defendant's raotion to quash and grantee
plaintiffs' motion to amend.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
This interlocutory appeal involves only the defendant
Skychoppers of Colorado which seeks a reversal of the trial cot
orders to the effect that the trial court be ordered to deny
plaintiffs' motion to amend process and to grant this defendant
motion to quash the process served upon it.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action arises out of a helicopter accident which
occurred in the State of Colorado on August 8, 1974 (R. 3, para
4 & 5).

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against all defendants or

August 7, 1978 (R. 2), which was served on Skychoppers of Color
in the State of Colorado on August 15, 1978 (R. 10).

The summc

served upon Skychoppers of Colorado provided that the complaint
attached thereto be answered within twenty (20) days (R. 9), ra
than thirty (30) days as required by Section 78-27-27, U.C.A.,
as amended.
On April 7, 1980, Skychoppers of Colorado appeared speci
in this action by filing a motion to quash the process served '
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n

c

it for the reason that said process did not comply with the j urisdictional requirements of Section 78-27-27, U.C.A., 1953, as
amended (R. 11).

A hearing on said motion was held before the

Honorable Bryant H. Croft, District Judge, on April 11, 1980
(R. 14).

At the time of said hearing, plaintiffs filed a motion

for leave to amend the process which previously had been served
upon this defendant (R. 15-16).
On April 14, 1980, Judge Croft entered orders, in the form
of a memorandum decision (R. 17), denying Skychoppers of Colorado's
motion to quash the process served upon it and granting plaintiffs'
motion to amend the sunnnons, which had already been served, to show
30 days rather than 20 days at the time for answering, and gave
this defendant 30 days thereafter in which to answer the complaint.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
TF..E AMENDMENT OF A SUMMONS PREVIOUSLY
SERVED, WHICH WAS AN ACCOMPLISHED AND
COMPLETED ACT.
This Court has previously distinguished the difference
between amending a return to show what was actually done in
effecting service of process, and attempting to retroactively
amend the process itself.

In Redwood Land Company v. Kimball, 20

Utah 2d 113, 433 P.2d 1010 (1967), this Court granted a petition
for an interlocutory appeal to review an order of the trial court
denying a motion to quash service of summons because the proof of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

service thereof was not made until eight days after the service
rather than within five days as required by Rule 4(g), U.R.C.P.
The trial court held that the defect in the filing of the "retu
was not jurisdictional and this Court affirmed, but in so doing
noted the difference between a defect in the proof of service a
a defect in the service itself, in the following language:
"We are in accord with the view adopted by
the trial court in denying the motion: That
the defect she complains of is not jurisdictional.
It is with respect to the
correctness of the summons itself, and the
due service, which notifies the defendant
that he is being sued, and by which jurisdiction over him is required, that there must
be strict compliance.
See 42 Am. Jur. 39;
Utah Sand and Gravel Products Corp. v.
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703.
However, proof of the fact that such service has
been made, also referred to as the 'return'
of the summons, is something of a different
character.
Its only purpose is to supply the
information to the court, the interested
parties and their attorneys, that the defendant
has been so served.
(Authorities cited)

*

*

*

"When the procedure proscribed for the
acquisition of jurisdiction of the defendant
has been properly carried out, that is, when
there has been a correct service of a proper
summons, a mistake or irregularity of the kind
shown here in the proof of service does not
destroy the validity of the service itself."
(Emphasis added.)
In the case at bar, there was not correct service of a
proper summons, since, as set forth in the following point, the
summons incorrectly stated the statutorily prescribed time peri
for answering the Complaint attached thereto.

Therefore, the
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trial court erred in pernitting the plaintiffs to "amend" a
summons which had been issued, served and returned some twenty
months earlier.
In their motion to amend the process, plaintiffs make the
absurd statement "That the granting of plaintiffs' Motion to Amend
would in no way prejudice the rights of the defendant, Skychoppers
of Colorado." (R. 16, para. 5).

This defendant had not been served

with a proper summons prior to the expiration of the applicable
1/
four-year statute of limitation- and, therefore, was not subject
to any liability in this action.

By allowing plaintiffs to amend

the service of process (an act which had already taken place),
the trial court effectively extended the statute of limitations
in this action.

The complaint in this matter was filed on the

last day before the controlling four-year statute of limitation
ran.

A new complaint cannot now be filed; and a new surnmons

cannot now be issued on the original complaint, since such issuance would not be within three months as required by Rule 4(b) U.R.C.P.
See, Fiberboard Paper Products Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65,
475 P.2d 1005 (1970); Cook v. Starkley, 548 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976).
It is difficult to conceive of a more prejudicial situation than
having a statute of limitation period extended after it has run.

1/
- Section 78-12-25, U.C.A., 1953, as amended.

-5-
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In Utah Sand & Gravel Products v. Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402
703 (1965), the court made the following observations regarding
our rules of civil procedure:
"It is true that our new rules of civil
procedure were intended to eliminate undue
emphasis on technicalities and to provide
liberality in procedure to the end that
disputes be heard and determined on their
merits. However, this does not mean that
procedure before the courts has become entirely 'without form and void.' The law
itself is a system of rules designed to
safeguard rights and preserve order, and
administration of justice under it must
necessarily be carried on with some
degree of order. This can be accomplished
only by compliance with the rules established
for that purpose. Liberality in their
interpretation and application should be
indulged where no prejudice or disadvantage
to anyone results, but where failure to comply with the rules will result in some substantial prejudice or disadvantage to a
¥arty, the~ should be adhered to with
ideli ty. "_I (Emphasis added. )
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO QUASH THE SUMMONS WHICH HAD
BEEN SERVED UPON THIS DEFENDANT
SINCE IT IMPROPERLY DESIGNATED
THE TIME REQUIREMENT FOR A."1SWERING.
While the case of Winters v. Hughes, 3 Utah 443, 24 Pac.
(1861), may be of more historical interest than anything else,

2/
- In support of this principal, the court footnoted the followi:
cases: Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah 2d 175, 264 P.Zd
279 (1953); and Holton v. Holton, 121 Utah ~51, 243 P.2d 438
(1952); Thomas v. District Court, 110 Utah 245, 171 P.2d 667
(1946); Glasmann v. 2nd Dist. Ct., 80Utah1, 12 P.2d 361 (1°
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does show that this Court long ago established the legal requirement that a summons must properly set forth the time and place
the defendant is required to answer or defend the charge being
made against him.

In dicta the court there observed:

it is unnecessary to consider whether
the court erred in overruling the motion to
quash the writ, and we only do so for the
purpose of settling the practice.
Section
2 of the Revised Laws provides 'that when
a complaint is filed the court shall issue
to the defendant a notice containing a copy
of the complaint, and the time and place
for the investigation thereof.'
Rev. Laws,
133.
. The legislature can prescribe the
manner in which a party may be brought into
court, and the method pointed out by law
must be substantially followed.
Neither
time nor place is mentioned, and both are
essential under the statute to constitute
legal notice to the defendant.
'Ten days
after the return' is too vague and indefinite,
and is really equivalent to leaving the time
blank, for how is the defendant to know
when the officer makes his return?

*

*

*

''We have no hesitation in saying that the
court erred in overruling the motion to
dismiss the writ.
If the defendant had
appeared and pleaded without first interposing the motion, the case would be
entirely different, but such was not
the fact, and his motion was well taken."
More recently this Court has held in several cases that
all statutory requirements of the issuance and service of summons
must be properly complied with in order to obtain jurisdiction
over a defendant.

In Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164

(1971), the court stated:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

"Service of summons in conformance with
the mode prescribed by statute is deemed
jurisdictional, for it is service of
process, not actual knowledge of the
commencement of the action, which confers
jurisdiction. Otherwise, a defendant could
never object to the sufficiency of service
of process, since he must have knowledge
of the suit to make such objection.
The
proper issuance and service of summons is
the means of invoking the jurisdiction of
the court and of acquiring jurisdiction
over the defendant; these cannot be supplanted by mere notice by letter, telephone
or any other such means."
The "other such means" must obviously include service of a surnmo:
not in conformity with statutory requirements.

See, Rees v. Seo

8 Utah 2d 134, 329 P.2d 877 (1958) regarding the failure of the
serving officer to endorse the date of service on the copy of th
summons he left with the defendant.
This Court has previously addressed this exact issue in
Martin v. Nelson, 533 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975), in which the Court
reversed a judgment based on a falsified return and because the
summons served on the California defendant required answering
within 20 rather than 30 days.

The return was conclusively shmi

to be false in that it indicated that the officer which served
the summons in the State of California had endorsed the date and
place of service together with signing his name on the summons,
the copy of the summons actually served on the defendant showed
such representation to be false.

This Court held as follows:
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"Service of process here was defective, not
only because of the false return, but because
it required answer in 20 days instead of 30
days. Such service is jurisdictional. Defendant,
as was his right, appeared specially and raised
the point.
"The case is remanded with instruction to
vacate the judgment and let the parties take
it from there." (Emphasis added.)
Other courts which have had occasion to address the issue
have likewise held that statutory requirements regarding the time
for answering must be strictly complied with.

In Vanover v.

Vanover, 307 P.2d 117 (Wyo. 1957), a summons was issued and served
upon the defendant requiring an answer the first Monday after its
date, rather than the second, third or fourth Monday after its
date as required by statute.

In reversing judgment for the

plaintiff, the court held:
"The return day of the summons is thus
made of special importance as it is from
that day the time is computed to determine
the day on or before which the defendant is
required to act and it also limits the time
within which legal service of that process
may be made. To permit a plaintiff to transgress these statutes by having the summons
specify the return day as the first Monday
rather than the second, third,or fourth
Monday for its return after issuance, as
the case may require it, would leave the
date of defendant's answer to the whom of
a plaintiff and allow plaintiff to flaunt
an express law of this state. This may not
be done. In consequence the summons issued
April 27, 1955, was defective and could not
give the court jurisdiction of the person
of the defendant even though it was timely
served upon the defendant personally, as
appears by the return."

-9-
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In a later decision, the same court held that a one day
miscalculation of when an answer was required in a service by
publication was defective.

Emery v. Emery, 404 P.2d 745 (Wyo.

1965) at 748:
"While counsel for appellant-wife
has not urged the matter, we think we
should call attention to the fact that the
record presented to us discloses a further
fatal defect in the service om Mrs. Emery.
The proof of publication reflects that the
last date of publication was July 18, 1961.
According to the published notice, defendant
was required to answer by August 16, 1961.
Consequently, only 29 days were allowed for
answer following the last day of publication,
instead of 30 days as provided for by
Rule 12(a), W.R.C.P.
"This exact situation was present in
National Supply Company v. Chittim, supra,
and we there held the defect fatal to the
jurisdiction of the court.
See at 387 P.2d
1012."

Similarly, in Van Gundy v. Ellis, et al., 246 F.Supp. 802
(U.S.D.C. S.D. Iowa 1965), the court noted regarding this issue:
"Furthermore, the plaintiff's process
incorrectly stated the time of required
appearance.
It has been held that this
error in itself is sufficient to label a
process defective.
Fernekes & Bros. v.
Case, 75 Iowa 152, 39 N.W. 238 (1888).
Thus, the first service of process upon
W. M. Tynan & Co. was defective. Moreover,
it was insufficient to toll any applicable
statute of limitations.
Burkhardt v.
Bates, 191 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Iowa 1961);
Fernekes & Bros. v. Case, supra."
(Emphasis
added.)
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POINT III
SKYCHOPPERS OF COLORADO NEVER
WAIVED SERVICE OF A PROPER SUMMONS
AND THERE IS NO DEFENSE TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION.
The trial court in its memorandum decision of April 14, 1980
(R. 17) made the following statement of facts, apparently in
justification of its denial of this defendant's motion to quash
the process served upon it.
"Said surmnons was served on Skycroppers [sic]
on August 8, 1978 and no answer or .default
certificate has ever been filed. Defendant's
motion to quash was filed April 7, 1980 -- some
20 months after service. The court denies the
motion to quash and grants plaintiffs' motion
to amend the surmnons."
However, the lower court gives no expression of a legal theory
or doctrine arising from said facts which would support its denial
of defendant's motion to quash.
Also, the plaintiffs in their motion to amend the surmnons
(R. 15-16) make no allegation that defendant did anything which
would constitute a waiver of its right to contest jurisdiction
of the court over it.

In fact, plaintiffs allege only that they

have never demanded an answer.

They make no claim that the

defendant ever represented it would not contest jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs do state in their motion:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

"Service of process was made on August 15,
1978; and plaintiffs since that time have
extended to defendants through its insurer
time within which to answer in that no answer
would be required so long as negotiations for
settlement were pending."
(R. 16, para. 2)
However, as a matter of fact, no settlement negotiations
have ever been commenced.

While it is impossible to cite a nega·

tive fact in the record, plaintiffs must acknowledge in their
responding brief that neither during the four-year period

betwe~

the time of the accident and when suit was cormnenced, nor during
the twenty-month period after suit was filed until defendant movi
to quash the summons, did plaintiffs ever make an offer of setn
ment to this or the other defendants in this action.
Consequently, plaintiffs can complain of no conduct on Chi
part of this defendant which has in any way prejudiced them.

In

fact, it was the plaintiffs who did not file their complaint unt
the day before the four-year statute of limitation period ran am
thereby incurred the risk that an out-of-state process server ma
not effect proper service and that such fact may not be discover
until it was too late to issue another summons under Rule 4(b);
U.R.C.P.

Fiberboard Paper Products Corp. v. Dietrich, supra;

Cook v. Starkley, supra.
The lower court decision seems to infer some affirmative
duty on the part of the defendant to have brought its motion to
quash earlier, but cites no legal doctrine to support such an
inference.

However, because of the fact that plaintiffs waited
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until the day before the statute of limitation ran before filing
their complaint and since the summons must issue within three
months after the complaint is filed, the same result would
obtain if defendant's motion to quash had been brought ninety-one
days after the improper service had issued.

After that date,

November 7, 1978, there is nothing plaintiffs could have done to
remedy the defective summons which had been issued, even if such
fact had come to their attention.
Since it is not contended that this defendant did anything
to waive the requirement that personal jurisdiction must be obtained
over it by the service of a proper summons upon it, the lower
court erred in not granting its motion to quash.

As stated in

Rees v. Scott, supra, a defendant has no burden of showing it was
misled by an improper surmnons as a prerequisite to bringing a
motion to quash such surmnons.

This Court therein stated:

"We see no merit in the contention that the
defendant has the burden to allege and prove
that he was misled by the defect.
The trial
court properly granted the motion to quash."
CONCLUSION
The record, as noted above, clearly demonstrates that the
summons served upon this defendant did not comply with the require-

3/
rnents of the "Utah Long Arm Statute."-

The record is also devoid

of any waiver of such requirements by the defendant.

Consequently,

'}__/

Section 78-27-27, U.C.A., 1953, as amended.

-13-
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defendant's motion to quash the process served upon it in the
State of Colorado should have been granted.

Likewise, the lower

court erred in permitting plaintiffs to "amend" the sununons whic
had been issued, served and returned twenty months earlier.
All facts giving rise to the problem here presented, i.e.
filing the complaint one day before expiration of the applicable
statute of limitation, drafting the summons requiring an answer
in twenty rather than thirty days, indefinitely extending the
time for answering (which went beyond the ninety days wherein a
correct summons could have been reissued) and never making a set:
ment offer in over five and one-half years after the accident
occurred (which caused defendant to attempt to conclude the matt
by litigation and thereby discover the defective service) were
generated by and were under the control of the plaintiffs.

It

would be unjust to now require this defendant to appear and defr
a lawsuit which was never properly served upon it during the
applicable period of limitation for bringing such an action.
WHEREFORE, the defendant Skychoppers of Colorado respect£
prays that the orders of the trial court be reversed and that ili
summons which was served upon this defendant be quashed and deen:
null and void.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _ _ day of August, 1980.
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